We perform decoy-state quantum key distribution between a low-Earth-orbit satellite and multiple ground stations located in Xinglong, Nanshan, and Graz, which establish satellite-to-ground secure keys with ~kHz rate per passage of the satellite Micius over a ground station. The satellite thus establishes a secure key between itself and, say, Xinglong, and another key between itself and, say, Graz.
Abstract:
We perform decoy-state quantum key distribution between a low-Earth-orbit satellite and multiple ground stations located in Xinglong, Nanshan, and Graz, which establish satellite-to-ground secure keys with ~kHz rate per passage of the satellite Micius over a ground station. The satellite thus establishes a secure key between itself and, say, Xinglong, and another key between itself and, say, Graz.
Then, upon request from the ground command, Micius acts as a trusted relay. It performs bitwise exclusive OR operations between the two keys and relays the result to one of the ground stations. That way, a secret key is created between China and Europe at locations separated by 7600 km on Earth. These keys are then used for intercontinental quantum-secured communication. This was on the one hand the transmission of images in a one-time pad configuration from China to Austria as well as from Austria to China. Also, a videoconference was performed between the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which also included a 280 km optical ground connection between Xinglong and Beijing. Our work points towards an efficient solution for an ultralong-distance global quantum network, laying the groundwork for a future quantum internet.
With the growth of internet use and electronic commerce, a secure global network for data protection is necessary. A drawback of traditional public key cryptography is that it is not possible to guarantee it is information theoretically secure. It has been witnessed in history that every advance of encryption has been defeated by advances in hacking. In particular, with the advent of Shor's factoring algorithm [1] , most of the currently used cryptographic infrastructure will be defeated by quantum computers.
On the contrary, quantum key distribution (QKD) [2] offers unconditional security ensured by the law of physics. QKD uses the fundamental unit of light, single photons, encoded in quantum superposition states which are sent to a distant location. By proper encoding and decoding, two distant parties share strings of random bits called secret keys. However, due to photon loss in the channel, the secure QKD distance by direct transmission of the single photons in optical fibers or terrestrial free space was hitherto limited to a few hundred kilometers [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . Unlike classical bits, the quantum signal in the QKD cannot be noiselessly amplified owing to the quantum no-cloning theorem [8] , already contained at the core of Wiesner's proposal of uncopiable quantum money [9] , where the security of the QKD is rooted.
The main challenge for a practical QKD is to extend the communication range to long distances, ultimately on a global scale. A promising solution to this problem is exploiting satellite and space-based links [10, 11] . That way, one can conveniently connect two remote points on Earth with greatly reduced channel loss because most of the photons' propagation path is in empty space with negligible loss and decoherence.
Very recently, QKD from a low-Earth-orbit satellite, Micius, to the Xinglong ground station close to Beijing has been demonstrated with a satellite-to-ground-station distance of up to 1200 km [12] .
In this Letter, we use the Micius satellite as a trusted relay to distribute secure keys between multiple distant locations in China and Europe. The Micius satellite, launched in August 2016, orbits at an altitude of about 500 km. As illustrated in Fig In this work, QKD is performed in a downlink scenario-from the satellite to the ground. One of the payloads in the satellite is a space-qualified QKD transmitter [12] , which uses weak coherent laser pulses to implement a decoy-state Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol that is immune to the photon-number-splitting attack [13, 14] .
Eight tunable fiber lasers, emitting light pulses with a wavelength of ~850 nm at a repetition rate of 100 MHz, are used to generate the signal, decoy and vacuum states. For secure QKD, the average intensity per pulse sent over the channel has to be at the single-photon level. As the photons travel from the fast-moving satellite (~7.6 km/s) through the atmosphere to the ground station over typically ~1000 km, several effects contribute to the channel loss such as beam diffraction, pointing errors, atmospheric turbulence and absorption. As is typical for photonic communication, decoherence can be ignored. To obtain a high signal-to-noise ratio in the QKD protocol, one cannot increase the signal power but only reduce the channel attenuation and background noise.
In order to optimize the link efficiency, we combine a narrow transmitting beam divergence (~10 μrad) with high-bandwidth acquisition, pointing, and tracking technique that ensures a typical tracking accuracy of ~1 μrad (ref. [12] and Extended Data Table I ). To reduce the background noise, the BB84-decoding setups in the optical ground stations are designed with a small field-of-view and employ low dark-count rate single-photon detectors.
The satellite flies along a sun-synchronized orbit which circles Earth every 94 minutes. Each night starting at around 0:50 AM local time, Micius passes over the three ground stations allowing for a downlink for a duration of ~300 s. Under reasonably good weather conditions, we can routinely obtain a sifted key rate of a ~3 kb/s at ~1000 km physical separation distance and ~9 kb/s at ~600 km distance (at the maximal elevation angle, note that this distance is greater than the satellite height due to the fact that the satellite does not fly directly over the ground stations), respectively. The 
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). This process can be easily understood as Micius uses MX to encrypt MG and Xinglong decrypts the cipher text to recover MG, shared with Graz. Such a key is known only to the two communicating parties and the satellite, but not any fourth party. In this work, we establish a 100 kB secure key between Xinglong and Graz. Similarly, secure keys between Nanshan and Xinglong, and between Nanshan and Graz can also be established.
For a real-world application of the space-to-ground integrated quantum network, GB, which consumed ~70 kB of the quantum key generated between Austria and China.
In summary, using Micius satellite as a trusted relay, we have demonstrated intercontinental quantum communication among multiple locations on Earth with a maximal separation of 7600 km. Our work already constitutes a simple prototype for a global quantum communications network. To increase the time and area coverage for a more efficient QKD network, we plan to launch higher-orbit satellites and implement day-time operation using telecommunication wavelength photons and tighter spatial and spectral filtering [17] . One limitation of the current implementation of the QKD protocol is that we have to trust the satellite itself, which can be overcome in the future using entanglement-based systems [18] [19] [20] . Other future developments will include multi-party connections from satellites to various ground stations in parallel, and the connection to large ground networks [16] , at first in China and Europe and then on a global scale. Each side en-/decrypted the picture with a simple bitwise XOR operation.
